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ARGUMENT
POINT I
INCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES IN THE DEFINITION
OF "MOTOR VEHICLE" IS A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE
AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The coverage of Ohio Casualty's motor vehicle dealer's bond
should be determined by reference to the definition of motor
vehicle which existed at the time that bond was issued.
Appellant argues for retroactive application of the amendment

adding mobile homes.

This belies appellant's doubt that the

earlier definition included mobile homes. Moreover, retroactive application is plainly inappropriate.
§ 68-3-3 provides that:

Utah Code Ann.

"No part of these revised is

retroactive unless expressly so declared."
Retroactivity was most recently addressed by the Utah
Supreme Court in Stephens v. Henderson, 63 Utah Adv. Rpt. 10
(August 13, 1987), where the Liability Reform Act was considered.

The court decided that the act, which eliminates joint

and several liability, should not be applied retroactively
because it affected substantive rights.

"The application of a

statute is retroactive if it alters the substantive law on
which the parties rely."

_Id. at 10. Ohio Casualty issued its

bond in reliance on the existing definition of motor vehicle.
To now expand the scope of that bond and Ohio Casualty's corresponding obligation, would directly affect the substantive
rights of the parties.

As in Stephens, the amendment should

not be given retroactive effect.
Appellant's argument that the amendment is simply a clarification of existing law begs the question.

Furthermore, the

case cited for applying clarifications retroactively is distinguishable from the present case.

In Foil v,, Ballinger, 601

P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), a medical malpractice claimant failed to
comply with the notice of intent to sue provisions of Utah Code
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Ann. § 78-14-8.

While the action was pending, the legislature

amended that statute to expressly provide that it did not apply
to actions arising prior to its effective date nor did it
determine when an action was commenced for statute of
limitations purposes.

The legislative history made it quite

clear that the legislature had added this amendment to clarify
its original intent.

The court noted:

Representative Bangerter, a co-sponsor of the original
act as well as of the amendment, stated in the House
of Representatives that a problem as to effectuation
of legislative intent with respect to the 1976 Act had
become apparent following an interpretation of the
Malpractice Act by the courts. He noted that this
Court had applied the notice requirement retroactively
and that the amendment was presented for the purpose
of overturning that decision and making it clear that
Section 78-14-8 is applicable only to causes of action
arising after April 1, 1976.
Id. at 150. Based on this history, the amendment was clearly
intended to correct and clarify the initial act.

No such

legislative history is present here.
In Foil, the court further acknowledged the danger of
applying acts retroactively whether for purposes of clarification or otherwise.

The court stated:

We recognize the potential mischief, indeed, the grave
constitutional problems, that could arise if the
Legislature were to attempt to determine the outcome
of a particular case by passage of a law intended to
accomplish such a purpose.
Id. at 151.

This observation is quite appropriate in the

present case where appellant has procured an affidavit from a
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state administrator to the effect that the amendment was sought
"in response to this type of litigation."
C. Fackerell, Jr., 1f 7.

Affidavit of Joseph

If the Motor Vehicle Administration

considered an amendment to the statute necessary, it was certainly appropriate to seek that amendment.

However, it is

inappropriate to attempt to enforce such an amendment in a case
that arose prior to the amendment.
POINT II
THE AMENDMENT ADDS MOBILE HOMES WHERE
THEY WERE NOT INCLUDED BEFORE.
Contrary to appellant's argument, the amendment including
mobile homes as motor vehicles does not imply that mobile homes
were included before the amendment.

If mobile homes were

included before, then there was no need for the amendment.
Most importantly, appellants have ignored the effect of the
Supreme Court's decision in Thorp Finance Corporation v.
Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (1965).
In Thorp the court interpreted the definition to include as
motor vehicles only those units for which the primary purpose
is use on the highways.

Id. at 207. This is entirely

consistent with the definition itself which only includes
"vehicles(s) intended primarily for use and operation on the
public highways."
amendment).

Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7 (before and after

Hence, twenty years ago, the Supreme Court
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concluded that house trailers were not motor vehicles.

The

legislature's recent amendment overrules this decision and the
rule of law that it created.
The fact that state agencies have treated mobile homes as
motor vehicles is of no consequence.

These agencies, at least

the Tax Commission, treated house trailers as motor vehicles
when Thorp was decided.

Id. at 208.

That did not affect the

court's interpretation of the definition.

It requires legisla-

tive action, not just historical agency practice, to change the
law.

From the ruling in Thorp until the legislative amendment,

the law of this state did not include mobile homes within the
definition of motor vehicles.
Appellant further suggests that the legislative history of
the amendment sheds no light on the question presented.
is not quite correct.

This

The legislature did indicate that one of

the objectives of the bill was to broaden the definition of
automobile dealer.

Utah Senate Debate; Second Reading of

Senate Bill 63; February 9, 1987, Day 29; 47th Legislature.
Clearly, that objective was met by adding mobile home dealers.
The fact that the amendment uses the term "including" has
no bearing.

Indeed, the current edition of Black's Law

Dictionary suggests that "include" can connote an addition as
well as a clarification.

According to Black's Law Dictionary,

p. 687 (5th ed. 1979), "include" means:

To confine within, hold as in an enclosure, take in,
attain, shut up, contain, enclose, comprise, comprehend, embrace, involve. Term may, according to
context, express an enlargement and have the meaning
of and or in addition to, or merely specify a particular thing already included within general words therefore used. "Including" within statute is interpreted
as a word of enlargement or illustrative application
as well as a word of limitation.
Hence, the use of the term "including mobile homes," is
entirely consistent with the expressed legislative intent to
broaden the scope of the statute.
The suggestion that "including mobile homes" was simply a
clarification of the statute must be rejected.

The statute was

clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in Thorp Finance
Corporation v. Wright to not include mobile homes.

The prac-

tice of state agencies treating mobile homes as vehicles
intended primarily for use and operation of the public highways
was simply contrary to the definition contained in the statute
before its amendment.

This court should not give retroactive

effect to the effort by those agencies to bring the law into
conformity with their practices.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons as well as those stated in Ohio Casualty's
previous briefs, Ohio Casualty's bond should not have been
construed by the lower court to cover fraud involving mobile
homes because mobile homes are not motor vehicles as that term
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was defined by the governing statute.

Ohio Casualty respect-

fully requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the lower
court and rule that Ohio Casualty is not liable to Shelter
America in any amount.
DATED this /'

day of October, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

/2^
M. Berry
Lund
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